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The Virtues of Bright Lines: Self-Determination, Secession, and
External Intervention
By Brad R. Roth

Abstract
The United Nations Charter-based international order sought to reconcile the selfdetermination of peoples with the inviolability of state boundaries by presuming sovereign
states to be manifestations of the self-determination of the entirety of their territorial
populations. This presumption, albeit notionally rebuttable, traditionally prevailed even
where states could only by a feat of ideological imagination be characterized as "possessed
of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction." But the international reaction to fragmentation in the former Yugoslaviaregarding both the initial "dissolution" and the subsequent struggle over Kosovo-called
into question the rigid doctrines of the past and opened the door to secessionist claims
theretofore dismissible as beyond the pale. Although no vindication of Russian
intervention in Ukraine can properly be drawn from the Yugoslav cases, the Ukrainian
crises help to surface the hidden dangers of an emerging jurisprudence that would allow
previously inadmissible considerations-whether ethnic, historical, constitutional, or
"democratic"-to compromise the territorial inviolability norm.
A. Introduction
At the level of abstract principle, the United Nations Charter (The Charter) speaks in the
name of the "Peoples of the United Nations" and predicates international peace and
cooperation "on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples."' Yet the Charter's paramount operative norm has long been understood to be
the territorial inviolability of existing sovereign states. This norm is highly prejudicial to the
putative political communities that assert themselves in configurations non-coextensive
with their states' territorial populations. By sweepingly prohibiting inter-state exertions of
coercion and force-while licensing such exertions within state boundaries-the
international legal order has effectively privileged sovereignty arrangements that frustrate
these communities' demands for self-governance.

Brad R. Roth Is a professor of politIcal science and law at Wayne State UnIversIty, Detroit, Michigan.
U.N. Charter Preamble, art. 1(2).
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Whether this tension rises to the level of a contradiction depends on how one understands
the legal meaning of "peoples"-as distinct from "ethnic, religious, or linguistic
minorities"2 or "indigenous or tribal peoples -aS well as how one understands the right
of all peoples "freely [to] determine their political status"-a phrase synonymous, in its
original usage, with an option on sovereign independence. The Charter and the U.N.
General Assembly's quasi-authoritative interpretive glosses-above all, the Friendly
Relations Declaration 5 adopted in 1970-can be construed to reconcile the selfdetermination of peoples with the territorial inviolability of states by first rebuttably
presuming sovereign states to be manifestations of the self-determination of the entirety
of their territorial populations, and then interpreting this presumption through a pluralistic
lens that disqualifies only the vestiges of western European colonialism." Thus, territorial
inviolability prevails even where states can, only by a feat of ideological imagination, be
characterized as "possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to
the territory without distinction." Crafted in an ideologically riven international society

2 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter

ICCPR].
See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries art. 1(3), Sept. 5, 1991, 72
.L.O. 169 ("The use of the term 'peoples' in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as
regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law."). But see G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration
an the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007) (seeming to elide the distinction).
4 See, e.g., GA. Res. 1514 (XV), annex, 1 2 (Dec. 14, 1960); Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra
note 3, art. 3 (ascribing to indigenous peoples the right to self-determination, nominally Including the right to
"freely determine their political status," though pointedly excluding any impairment of existing states' "territorial
integrity or political unity"); id. at art. 46. This qualification apparently assuaged African states that had
theretofore insisted that the "principle of self-determination applies only to peoples under colonial and/or

foreign occupation." African Group, Draft Aide Memoire on United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
indigenous Peoples (2006), nttp://www.ipacc.org.za/uploads/docs/Africanaidememoire.pdf.

GA. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of international Law ConcernIng Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter
Friendly Relations Declaration].

See Brad R. Roth, Secessions, Coups, and the international Rule of Law. Assessing the Decline of the Effective
Control Doctrine, 11 Melbourne J. Int'I L. 393, 402-09 (2010) (showing that

immediately

following the

decolonization of the bulk of the Non-Self Governing TerrItories, the dominant conception of self-determination
was tightly bound up with non-ntervention in the internal affairs of emergent states); see, e.g., G.A. Res. 2131
(XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibilityof Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of
Their Independence and Sovereignty (Dec. 21, 1965); G.A. Res. 36/103, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (Dec. 9, 1931) [hereinafter 1981 Non-Intervention

Resolution] (an especially provocative 1981 non-Intervention resolution, passed 120-22-6 over the opposItion of
many western liberal states, asserting that "[t]he dutyof a State to refrain from the exploitation and the

distortion of human rights Issues as a means of interference n the internal affairs of States").
I Friendly Relations Declaration, supro note 5 ("[W]Ithout distinction as to race, creed or color."); see also G.A.
Res. 50/6 (Dec. 14, 1995), ¶ 1 ("[W]Ithout distinction of any kind."); World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna
Declaration and Programme ofAction, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (June 25, 1993).
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comprised of western, socialist, and non-aligned blocs, this approach furnished the
minimalist normative foundations essential to a broadly acknowledged global territorial
order.
Arguably, this "squaring of the circle" has passed into the realm of legal history.
International reactions to the crises of authority on the territory of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)-in particular, the 1991-1992 recognitions of the
SFRY's constitutionally pre-established federal units (most importantly, Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina) as independent and inviolable states in the wake of the federation's nonconsensual "dissolution," as well as the increasingly widespread acceptance of Kosovo's
2008 Unilateral Declaration of Independence-have called into question the premises of
the Cold War-era settlement. Critical elements of the applicable positive law, including the
existence vel non of circumstances justifying external support for secession of integral units
of sovereign states, are now authoritatively conceded to be unsettled. Moreover, the
Yugoslav and other cases have inspired among many advocates and scholars a
disparagement of the traditional territorial integrity norm for its insensitivity to claims
based on considerations of democracy, constitutionality, history, or ethno-national
coherence
There are, however, dangers inherent in invoking such considerations against the norm of
territorial inviolability. The multifarious interpretations of those considerations in a
pluralistic international legal environment jeopardize the few bright lines that have been
drawn to establish a framework of accommodation among bearers of otherwise
incompatible political values. By taking considerations of democracy, constitutionality,
history, and ethno-national coherence "off the table" in determinations of the admissibility
of aid to secession,"0 traditional norms against cross-border projections of coercive power
transcend competing perspectives on the legitimacy and justness of internal arrangements.
To predicate the foundations of the peace and security order on ideologically contested
propositions would signal that an external use of coercion or force to revise sovereign
boundaries amounts to just another political conflict, rather than an extraordinary breach
requiring an emergent and coordinated international response.
See, e.g., Accordance with International Law of the Uni ateral Declaration of Independence

Advisory Opinion, 2010 LC. 403,

11

in Respect of Kosovo,

82 (July 22) [hereinafter Kosovo Advisory Opinion] (noting that states have

expressed "radically different views" on the doctrinal issues central to determining Kosovo's status: (1)

"[w]hether, outside the context of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation,
domination, and exploitation, the international law of self-determination of peoples confers upon part of the
population of an existing State a right to separate from that state"; (2) "whether international law provdes for a
right of "remedial secession" and, if so, in what circumstances"; and (3) "whether the circumstances which some
participants maintained would give rise to a right of 'remedial secession' were actually present in Kosovo").
k See, e.g., JURE VIDMAR, DEMOCRATIC STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE EMERcENCE or NEW STATES IN POST-COLD WAR
PRACTICE 225-30 (2013) [herein after VIDMAR].
in See, e.g, Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 5 ("Every State shall refrain from any
action aimed at the
partal or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country.").

2015

The Virtues of Bright Lines

387

The Ukraine Crises of 2014-2015 offer a reminder of the value of an international modus
vivendi that brackets ideological disputes and affirms a (relatively) inflexible standard of
territorial inviolability. Even given the uncertainties that developments of the last two
decades have introduced, Russia's armed take-over of Crimea, and its direct and ndirect
forcible interventions in support of the 'People's Republics" of Donetsk and Luhansk, are
unambiguous violations of international legal norms." But the more responsive the
applicable law becomes to considerations that can be branded as either so controverted as
to be parochial or so open-textured as to be indeterminate, the less that international law
can serve to mobilize broad-based opposition to cross-border mischief and predation.
To be sure, the traditional insistence on territorial inviolability of existing states has an
element of arbitrariness at its core. On occasion, this arbitrariness places intolerable stress
on the putative rule, justifying the emergence of a narrow exception in keeping with the
traditional framework's basic logic; a normative order that cannot bend will likely break.
But an overall approach more favorable to external encouragement of secession would
ultimately serve neither the moral principle of self-determination nor the practical project
of inter-state peace.
B. The Neglected Virtues of Bright Lines: International Law in the 2014-2015 Ukraine
Crises
Given the prevalent absence of authoritative interpretation-let alone adjudication and
enforcement-international law is frequently dismissed as so open-textured as to admit of
competing conclusions about its application to any significant controversy. Yet,
international law also incurs criticism for the inflexibility of its foundational rules, which are
deemed both insensitive to imperative principles of justice and unrealistic in the face of
non-compliant but efficacious policies.
The Ukraine Crises of 2014-2015 provide occasion to affirm that international law indeed
has determinate relevant applications; that its characteristic inflexibilities ground
cooperation among participants who cannot be expected to agree about justice; and that
de-legitimation of unlawful conduct serves an important purpose even where noncompliant policies cannot be reversed in the near term. Russian actions against Ukrainian
territorial integrity have transgressed bright lines, provoking widespread condemnation as
well as economic sanctions from some of Russia's most important trading partners. The
" See, e.g., GA. Res. 68/262 (Mar. 27, 2014) (reaffirming Ukrainian territorial Integrity against the purported
transfer of Crimea to the Russian Federation, by a vote of 100 to 11-though disappointingly, there were 58
abstentions and 24 absences). As Mikulas Fabry's contrIbution to this symposlum notes, the vote count
understates the extent of expressed legal disapproval of Russia's action, as reflected in the comments of several
states that saw fit to withhold an affirmative vote on the resolution. Mikulas Fabry, How to Uphold the Territorial
Integrity of Ukraine, 16 GERMAN LJ. 416, 422 (2015).
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brightness of these lines entails ruling out of consideration a series of matters that, while
significant from some normative perspectives, have traditionally been understood to be
legally irrelevant.
1. The Irrelevance of the Allegedly Unconstitutional Change of Governmentin Kiev
In February 2014, following massive opposition demonstrations and a violent response by
his government's forces, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled the capital, ultimately
taking refuge in Russia. The Ukrainian legislature thereupon purported to formalize his
removal from office and to replace him with an acting president. Nonetheless, in the
contemporaneous words of Center for Strategic & International Studies fellow Stefan
Soesanto:
Ascertaining the legitimacy of the interim government
in Kiev is quite tricky. According to Article 111 of the
Ukrainian constitution, the President can only be
impeached from office by parliament through "no less
than three-quarters of its constitutional composition."
On 22 February 2014 the Ukrainian parliament voted
328-0 to impeach President Yanukovych who fled to
Russia the night prior. However for an effective
impeachment under constitutional rules, the 449seated parliament would have needed 337 votes to
remove Yanukovych from office. Thus under the
current constitution, Yanukovych is still the incumbent
and legitimate President of the Ukraine.12
The question became more than academic in the days that followed, when Russia cited an
"invitation" from the constitutional president to send troops into Crimea "to protect
civilians."'
Traditional doctrine assigns no significance to this controversy. From this vantage point,
neither Yanukovych's international standing nor the validity of his invitation turns on
discernment of the "right" answer as a matter of Ukrainian constitutional law. The
international legal order is not a legal order of legal orders, but a legal order of sovereign
12

Stefan Soesanto, quoted in Ashley Deeks, Russia in Ukraine: A Reader
Responds, LAWFARE, March 5, 2014,

http://www.Iawfareblog.com/2014/03/russia-in-ukraine-a-reader-responds/ (last vIsIted June 18, 2015).

1 Ukraine's

Yonukovych Asked for Troops, Russia Tells UN, BBC, Mar. 4, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-

europe-26427848 (last visited June 18, 2015). Not long afterward, Yanukovych retracted the "invitation." See also
Associated Press, Yanukovych Says He Was "Wrong" on Crimea, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2,
http://www.nytimes.com/apornline/2014/04/02/world/europe/ap-eu-russia-yanukovych.rtmlref-world
visited June 18, 2015).

2014,
(last
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political communities bearing the "inalienable right" to choose their own political
systems, and therefore to breach, alter, or overthrow their existing constitutions. The test
for a governmental apparatus's capacity to exercise a state's international legal rights has
traditionally been 'effective control through internal processes"; this has generally
remained so-save for highly exceptional circumstances (Haiti, 1991-1994; Sierra Leone,
1997-1998; Cote d'lvoire, 2010-2011)-even where unconstitutional changes of
government have drawn adverse political reactions (including suspensions of the state's
participation in intergovernmental organizations).'
Having been effectively ousted, Yanukovych lacked all standing to speak for Ukraine
internationally. He had even less standing to consent unilaterally on Ukraine's behalf to the
introduction of foreign forces for the purpose of imposing a partisan conception of public
order (one that had manifestly suffered substantial, even if not country-wide, popular
repudiation).
Even more clearly, disturbance of a governmental order does not vitiate the territorial
integrity of a state; such a disturbance at most raises questions about the legal standing of
the agent (the government) to represent the principal (the state), not about the principal's

Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 5 ("Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political,
economic, social and cultural systems, without Interference in any form by another State."). The International
Court of Justice famously noted In the Nicaragua case that to hold a state's adherence to any particular
governmental doctrine a violation of customary international law "would make nonsense of the fundamental
principle of State sovereignty, on which the whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the
political, social, economic and cultural system of a State." Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 LCJ. 14, 11 263 (June 27) (emphasis added).
14

15

See Brad R. Roth, Sovereign Equality and Non-Liberal Regimes, 43 NETH. Y.B.

INT'L

L. 25, 44-48 (2012).

iG By the logic of self-determination that grounds the effective
contral doctrine, even a stil -recognized
government-at least, where its recognition had been essentially attributable to its having achieved effective
contra through internal processes-would appear to lack standing to invite foreign forces to resolve a full-blown
crisis of governmental authority. See e.g., Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military latervention by
Invitation of the Government, 56 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 233-34 (1985); see generally INSTITUT DE DROIT INT'L,
Resolution. The Principle of Non-intervention in Civil Wars, Aug. 14, 1975, http://www.1dii l.org/fdiE/resolutionsE/1975_wies_03_en.pdf. This limitation has, concededly, not held up well in practice,
especially where the government has had other indicators of popular approval or the opposition has been tainted
by unlawful foreign assistance or peculiarly bad conduct.

Moreover, even where a given governmental order as a whole can speak unilaterally for the state, there is often
reason to question whether a head of state or head of government can speak unilaterally for that governmental
order In inviting foreign troops onto national territory. Where an elected president is unconstitutionally ousted by
an elected legislature (as in Honduras In 2009 or Ukrane in 2014) there is guaranteed (almost Irrespective of the
actual language of the constitution) to be an "objectively evident" constitutional doubt about such Presidential
authority-let alone (as in the Crimea example) where exercised with the effect of ceding national territory to a
foreign power.
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status or sovereign rights. Thus, a breach of constitutional norms does not problematize
the unity of a state-irrespective of whether its constitutional organization is federal or
unitaryia-even where the irregularly constituted government is unpopular or not
immediately efficacious in particular parts of the national territory.' 9
1. The irrelevance of Crimea's Alleged Will to Secede and Join the Russian Federation
In a hastily organized referendum, held under less than free and fair conditions, an
ostensible majority of Crimean voters opted for secession from Ukraine and incorporation
into Russia.2 Putting aside the irregularities that tainted both the regional parliament's
vote to call the referendum and the referendum itself, Crimea's ethnic mix and various
evident manifestations of regional public opinion lend a general plausibility to the claim
that some substantial majority-even if not the officially-reported overwhelming
majority-favored the region's transfer to Russian control.

17 States retain their international legal personality, as well as obligations previously incurred,
notwithstanding

fundamental changes of governmental order, The political community is not understood to be re-founded when
there is constitutional discontinuity; In Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, It is not that democratic Hungary succeeds to the
international legal obligations of communist Hungary, but that the obligations incurred by Hungary's communist
government are those of Hungary tout court. See Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 1.C.J. 7, 64, 9 104 (Sept. 25) ("profound changes of a political nature'-the collapse of

communism-did not amount to a "fundamental change n circumstances" affecting treaty obligatons).
i See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. No. 19, art. 2 ("The
federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law.').
19

Unfortunately, the Badinter Commission's opinions on the 1991-1992 Yugoslav crisis introduce confusion
by

conflating issues of domestic-constitutional and international law. The Commission reasoned that because the

very existence of the Yugoslav state presupposed functionIng federal instItutions, the collapse of these
institutions and the recourse to force entailed nothing less than "a process of dissolution" of the Yugoslav state

into its component republics. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, OpInions on Questions
Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Jan. 11, 1992, July 4, 1992, 31 1.L.M. 1488, 1496-1500 [hereinafter
Badinter Commission Opinions]. However, this rationale of the European community's arbitral commission arose
in response to unique circumstances, and thus far, no general trend has emerged to support any ambitious
extrapolations from the logic of the Badinter judgments.
2n David Herszenhorn, Crimea Votes to Secede From Ukraine as Russian Troops Keep Watch, N.Y. TIMES,
March 16,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/europe/crimea-ukraine-secession-vote-referendum.htmI
(last
visited June 13, 2015). But see C. J. Cnivers & Patrick Reevell, Russia Moves Swiftly to Stifle Dissent Ahead of
Secession Vote N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/world/europe/pressure-andintimidation-sweep-crimea-ahead-of-secession-vote.ntml (last visited June 18, 2015) ("With a mix of targeted

intimIdation, an expansive military occupation by unmistakably elite Russian units and many of the trappings of
the election-season carnivals that have long accompanied rigged ballots across the old Soviet world, Crimea has

been swept almost instantaneously into the Kremlin's fold.").
" Crimea Referendum: Voters 'Back Russia Union,' BBC, March 16, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-26606097 (last visited June 13, 2015) ("Some 58% of people in Crimea are ethnic Russian, with the rest
made up of Ukrainians and Tatars.").
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Whatever facts might be convincingly established about popular sentiment in the region,
the territory's international legal status would, according to traditional doctrine, be
unaffected. Sub-national units, however unambiguous may be their popular mandate for
secession, lack an international legal right to be acknowledged as independent and to
thereby invite foreign intervention. Even if "remedial secession"-as to the legality of
which the International Court of Justice expressly withheld judgment in its advisory opinion
on Kosovo's Unilateral Declaration of independence2"-could be successfully invoked in the
face of demonstrable predation on the part of the central government, mere popular
apprehension about possible future predation would not plausibly justify a change in a
region's international status.
Additionally, the region's ethnic composition-however dissimilar to that of the state to
which it presently belongs, or compatible with that of the state to which it aspires to
belong-is not legally material. Nor is it material that the region's incorporation into the
former state occurred for arbitrary reasons and in contradiction to the region's historical
ties to the latter state. Territorial allocations are notoriously arbitrary, and if such
arbitrariness were allowed to problematize inter-state boundaries, the result would be to
license cross-border violence across the globe.
Nor can "democratic" considerations, despite their increased relevance in international
law, 2 3 resolve the "majority of whom" problem inherent in self-determination
controversies outside of the decolonization context.24 Not only is the regional population
not the only cognizable stakeholder, but majority votes within a sub-national territory may
compromise the political equality of internal minorities-all the more likely where the
regional majority's ethnic identity grounds the independence claim. Even where regional
boundaries have a pre-existing constitutional status and reflect authentic historical
delineations, rather than ethnic gerrymandering, the international order has little reason
to disincentivize conferrals of constitutional autonomy by transmogrifying them into
instruments for the disruption of state sovereignty.
IlL The Irrelevance of Ukraine's Resort to Force to Resolve a Political Dispute in Its Eastern
Regions
In response to the proclamations of the 'People's Republics" of Donetsk and Luhansk, the
Ukrainian central government has demonstrated resolve to restore its territorial integrity
through the use of military force. This might be thought to run afoul of an emerging
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supro note 8, para. 82.
23 See generally Gregory H. Fx& Brad R. Roth, Democracy and International Law, 27 REV.
INT'LSTUDS. 327 (2001).
24 As noted famously by Ivor Jennings: "[T]he people cannot decide until somebody
decides who are the people."

IVoR JENNINIs, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 55-56 (1956), quoted in VIDIAR, supra note 9, at 243.
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international legal norm against recourse to force to resolve internal political disputes-an
internal jus ad belium responsive to the contemporary reality that civil conflicts rather than
inter-state wars now constitute the greatest overall "threat to the peace." 5 Such a
development might even be imagined to license Russia to provide cross-border military
support (in the form of weaponry or even direct uses of force) to the embattled enclaves,
to prevent their being bloodily overrun and to encourage a political rather than a military
solution.
Though some may wish to see the emergence of an internal jus ad bellum, its realization in
positive international law is far-off and likely to be elusive. Such a norm-unless it were to
freeze any status quo established by whatever means on the ground, thereby rewarding
quick forcible seizures-would require prejudgment of the merits of internal disputes.
Absent such prejudgment-analogous to, but inevitably far more complicated than, the
international order's insistence on respect for borders (however arbitrarily drawn)-it
would be impossible to answer the fundamental question: Is what counts as "recourse to
violence" the resistance to de facto territorial authority, or the suppression of that
resistance? Any such intricately qualitative judgment would be open to charges of bias and
parochialism.
Thus far in international law, the concept of jus ad bellum designedly has had no
application to internal conflict. Insurgents seeking secession (or regime change) enjoy no
international protection (other than the truncated set of jus in bello standards applicable
to non-international armed conflicts), but so long as they are not inadmissibly assisted
from abroad (or seeking to frustrate decolonization), international law does not seek
affirmatively to constrain them from taking their best shot at seizing power, nor to deprive
them of success should they achieve it.26 At the same time, states maintain the sovereign
right to suppress challenges to their territorial integrity, and their acknowledged
governments are vested with authority on their behalf to use force (within the tactical
limitations established by international jus in bello norms) to secure that aim. More
crucially, no foreign state has the authority to supply cross-border support to forces

It is sometimes suggested that the pattern of recent Security Council's Chapter VII edicts in response to in
internal conflicts establishes a norm against recourse to violence to resolve internal political disputes. See, e.g.,
Kalkidan Obse, The Arab Spring and the Question of Legality of Democratic Revolution in Theory and Practice: A

25

Perspective Based on the African Union Normative Framework, 27 LEIDEN

].

INT'L L. 817, 828-29 (2014). But the

Security Council's extemporary decrees, even if they could be said to comprise such a pattern, do not by
themselves establish norms applicable in the absence of Chapter VII resolutions.
2

As the IC in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion noted, the "illegality attached to the declarations of independence [of

Southern Rhodesia, Northern Cyprus, and Republika Srps(a] stemmed not from the unilateral character of these
declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of
force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory
character (jus cogens)." Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 81.
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defending insurgent-held internal territory. The paradigmatic example is the lawfulness
(putting aside the jus in bello controversies) of Croatia's forcible extinguishment (in
Operations Flash and Storm of 1995) of Serb-nationalist insurgent enclaves in Western
Slavonia and Krajina, as against the almost-universally acknowledged unlawfulness of
support for those enclaves by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
IV. The 2014-2015 Ukraine Crises as on Argument Against Muddying the Waters
Russia's incursions, direct and indirect, into Ukraine have crossed a bright line. Observers
from a multiplicity of normative perspectives can perceive in common this transgression.
(Indeed, in respect of its intervention in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Russia's factual
denials, however implausible, manifest a consciousness of the norm's clarity.) The bright
line exists as part of a framework of accommodation among bearers of a diversity of
interests and values.2 It makes possible cooperation among international actors who
cannot be expected to agree on the legitimacy or justice of internal governmental
arrangements. If, in pursuit of a higher justice, the global system forsakes traditional norms
in favor of more nuanced and value-laden approaches to international involvement in
internal conflict, it will end up grounding its foundational norms in the very principles that
are inconclusively contested. Legal condemnation will thus be indistinguishable from mere
political condemnation.
Legal assessments are, of course, inherently and ineluctably political. They are not,
however, reducible to mere partisanship; indeed, it is precisely the political purposes that
they serve that require their transcendence of immediate political agendas. Events such as
Russia's putative annexation of Crimea and its intervention in Eastern Ukraine, though
resistant to total abolition, are nonetheless fairly rare occurrences in contemporary
international relations. To keep them rare, the international order needs to be able to
distinguish violations of foundational norms from conduct that is merely politically
provocative, and thus subject to assessments that turn on differing geostrategic interests
and ideological principles. It is a pluralist normative order that establishes and maintains
the capacity to call aggression by its true name.

' See, e.g., Friendly Relations Declaraton, supra note 5 ("[N]o State shall

interfere in cvil strife in another

State.").
See generally BRAD R, ROTH, SOVEREIGN EQUALITYAND MORAL DISAGREEMENT(2011).

The preceding section was adapted from the written version of panel remarks delivered at the October 2014
annual meeting of the American Branch of trhe International Law Association. Brad R. Roth, The Neglected Virtues
of Bright Lines: InternationalLaw in the 2014-15 Ukraine Crises, 21 ILSAJ. INT'L& COMP. L. 317 (2015).
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C. The Inevitable Blurring of Lines: International Law in the Yugoslav Cases
The traditional approach outlined above is concededly unappetizing. It sacralizes
boundaries that reflect conquests predating the establishment of the twentieth-century
global peace-and-security order, and addresses internal conflicts in a manner designedly
neutral as between just and unjust-perhaps even good and evil-causes. It reaffirms and
reinforces outcomes that can range from untoward to morally intolerable.
One thus cannot be surprised that the international community has abided ad hoc
deviations from the traditional approach's strict logic. But one equally cannot be surprised
that in so doing, the international community has sought to assimilate innovations to
business as usual, avoiding any overt admission of fundamental change in the doctrinal
structure. This combination has led to intellectual dishonesty and an accompanying
erosion of doctrinal foundations, without the emergence of any substituted doctrinal
framework for resolving secession questions.
A crucial episode occurred at the commencement of the post-Cold War era with the
international community's recognition of the statehood and territorial inviolability of units
declaring independence from the unraveling Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY). That collective practice drew on a legalistic rationale provided by the judgments of
European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission (Badinter
Commission). For reasons that made eminent political sense, the Badinter Commission
judgments were presented as applications of unaltered international law. Yet on close
examination, the judgments failed altogether to square with the logic of the pre-existing
doctrine. Both the outcomes and the seemingly disingenuous denials of innovation served
several important political (and indeed, moral) purposes, but they raise significant
questions about the principles and policies that actually animate recognition practice.
A second episode stemming from the Yugoslav experience was the international reaction
to the 2008 Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the "Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment of Kosovo." This episode, too, is associated with authoritative legal
commentary, although the ICJ Advisory Opinion scrupulously evaded the pivotal questions,
thereby allowing a deviation from traditional doctrine to co-exist with continuing denials of
doctrinal change.
1. Non-Consensual Dissolution: The Bodinter Commission's Unacknowledged Improvisation
On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia-component republics of the Yugoslav federationdeclared independence. Slovenia's ensuing seizure of border posts in its territory from the
Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) prompted a brief armed conflict, but a cease-fire shortly
followed. Slovenia's path to independence-though formally delayed by the terms of the 7
July 1991 Brioni Accords-was from then on essentially unimpeded.
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Croatia's independence effort, however, prompted much more serious difficulties. Forces
representing Croatia's minority (twelve to fifteen percent) Serb population, geographically
concentrated in the central region of Krajina and the northeastern regions of Western and
Eastern Slavonia," were in armed rebellion against the elected nationalist Croatian
government-rebellion facilitated by units of the Serb-dominated JNA stationed in
Croatian territory. Pro-independence governments in Macedonia and in BosniaHerzegovina were also laying the groundwork for secession, meaning that four of the six
Yugoslav republics, comprising a majority (over fifty-six percent) of the federation's
population, were seeking to withdraw from the SFRY. With the federal government's
constitutional processes deadlocked, Serbia's partisans within federal institutions resorted
to unconstitutional measures to seek to maintain the federation on Serbia's terms or,
failing that, to annex to Serbia substantial Croatian and Bosnian territories bearing
concentrated Serb populations.
As the war in Croatia intensified, with the preponderance of atrocities being committed by
Croatian Serb irregulars, the European Community on 27 August 1991 formed a
Commission to advise on the legalities of the crisis. (Although referred to as an "Arbitration
Commission," its judgments were understood not to be binding.) The Commission,
comprised of five European Constitutional Court Presidents from France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and Belgium., was led by French Conseil Constitutionnel President Robert Badinter.
Notwithstanding the Commission's august membership, its mandate left little doubt from
the outset about the contours of its ultimate conclusions. Simultaneously with their
formation of the Commission, the EC ministers issued the following statement:
The European Community and its member States are
dismayed at the increasing violence in Croatia. They
remind those responsible for the violence of their
determination never to recognize changes of frontiers
which have not been brought about by peaceful means
3 Peter Radan, The Serb Krajina: An Unsuccessful Secession from Croatia, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO

SECESSION, 523, 523 (Aleksandar Pavkovid & Peter Radan eds., 2011). From the standpoint of many of Croatia's
Serbs, withdrawal from the federation represented an existential threat, vitiating that community's consent to

the boundaries of the republic. The new Croatian proto-state officially characterized itself as "the national state of
the Croat nation," with Serbs relegated to the status of a national minority rather than a constituent nation. Id.
For good measure, it adopted some of the same historical symbols of Croatian identity employed by World War IIera Nazi-backed Independent State of Croatia (NDH), which encompassed roughly the territory of both Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina and which orchestrated mass killings ofSerbs.

A Prosecutor v. Martit, Case No. IT-95-11-T, paras. 161-336 (Int'l Crim. Trb. for the Former Yugoslavia June
12,
2007) (showing factual findings and details of the character of the Serb-nationa list military and paramilitary

campaign in Croatla).
" See, e.g., VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 79.
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and by agreement. It is a deeply misguided policy on the
part of the Serbian irregulars to try to solve the
problems they expect to encounter in a new
constitutional order through military means. It is even
more disconcerting that it can no longer be denied that
elements of the Yugoslav People's Army are lending
their active support to the Serbian side. The Community
and its member States call on the Federal Presidency to
put an immediate end to this illegal use of the forces
under its command. The Community and its member
States will never accept a policy of fait accompli. They
are determined not to recognize changes of borders by
force and will encourage others not to do so
either....
These statements, consistent with earlier pronouncements of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 3 4 manifestly prejudged all of the essential elements of
the legal controversy. What remained was to rationalize the solution-independence for
Croatia and other seceding republics with their constitutionally established boundaries
intact-by reference to existing legal doctrines.

Declaration of Yugoslavia, European Political Cooperation Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting, No. 4b/64 of 27
Aug. 1991, reprintedia LUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: KEY DOCUMENTs 363 (Christopher Hill & Karen E. SmIth eds., 2000)
(emphasis added), http://hist.asu.ru/aes/EFPDocuments_0415158222.pdf.
Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86
AM. L INT'L L 569, 575 (1992).
3

The official Serbian counter-narrative was as follows:
The Serbian people ...

demanded respect and protection of their

legitimate national and civil rights. When Croatia decided to secede
from Yugoslavia and form its own independent State, the Serbs
inhabiting their ethnical territories in this republic decided to break
away from Croatia and remain within Yugoslavia .... Faced with the
serious danger of a more widespread conflict, the Presidency of the
SFRY instructed the Yugoslav People's Army to prevent such conflicts
by standing as a neutral force between the parties in conflict.
However, the Croatian authorities, instead of accepting such a
mission of the YPA [JNA], openly attacked not only the Serbian
people which it branded as a band of outlaws, but also. . . the
Yugoslav People's Army which it termed an army of occupation. This
is how war was thrust upon Yugoslavia. In such a situation It was
essential to protect the Serbian people from extermination.
S.F.R.Y. Collective Presidency Chair Barisav Jovic, Address at the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Mar. 19, 1992), reprinted in REV. INTrLAFFAIRS 11-12 (1992), quoted in Weller, supra note 34, at 574.
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While many scholars have criticized the Badinter Commission judgments, few have
identified the fundamental problem: The Commission was charged with accomplishing a
task that fell not merely outside the scope of existing legal rules, but ultro vires of
international law's traditional purposes. The traditional approach of international law did
not provide-nor purport to provide-a principled basis for governing the interactions of
the federation's constituent groups; it left those as matters 'essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction," to be worked out through internal processes, however harsh.
The central theme of the Commission's approach was to characterize the SFRY not as a
state in civil war, beset by multiple contested efforts at secession, but as a federation
undergoing a non-consensual "dissolution." Traditionally, however, crises of constitutional
or other effective authority have not been deemed to affect a state's status. Many statesquintessentially Somalia and Lebanon-have experienced long periods during which they
have lacked an effective central government while rival authorities have maintained zones
of control, but it has never been suggested that these states had "dissolved." Absent
mutual consent of efficacious regional authorities, dissolution would follow only from a
decisive creation-by force, if necessary-of a stable set of new facts on the ground.
But of course, such fact creation was precisely what the Badinter Commission had, quite
understandably, been designed to pre-empt. The result was a blend of constitutional law
and international law principles, concocted in order to draw a line against the ethnonational project that both the European political leadership and the judges evidently
deemed, on moral and political grounds-and not without justification in those terms-to
be most at fault for the descent into violence: the Serb nationalist movement.
The critical move came in the Commission's very first Opinion, dated 29 November 1991.
There, the Commission asserted that:
In the case of a federal-type State, which embraces
communities that possess a degree of autonomy and,
moreover, participate in the exercise of political power
within the framework of institutions common to the
Federation, the existence of the State implies that the

For trenchant criticisms of the Badinter Commission opinions, see, e.g., MIODRAG JOVANOVIC, CONSTITUTIONALIZING
SECESSION IN FEDERALIZED STATES: A PROCEDURAL APPROACH 83-114 (2007); Timothy

WIlliam Waters, Contemplating

Failure and Creating Alternatives in the Balkans: Bosnia's Peoples, Democracy, and the Shape of Self-

Determination, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 423, 438-44 (2004); Mikulas Fabry, International Norms of Territorial integrity
and the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, 16 GLOBAL Soc'y 145 (2002); Peter Radan, Yugoslavia's Internal Borders as
international Borders: A Question of Appropriatreteness, 33 L. EUR. Q. 137 (1999); Michla Pomerance, The
Bodinter Commission: The Use and Misuse of the International Court of Justice's Jurisprudence, 20 MICHIGAN J. INT'L
L. 31 (1998); Hurst Hannum, Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe: Old Wine in New Bottles? 3 TRANSNAT'L. L.
& CONTEMP. PROBs. 57 (1993).
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federal organs represent the components of the
37
Federation and wield effective power.
In assessing the facts on the ground at that time, the Commission found that:

.

The composition and workings of the essential organs
of the federation . . . no longer meet the criteria of
participation and representativeness inherent in a
federal state; the recourse to force has led to armed
conflict from the different elements of the federation
which has caused the death of thousands of people and
wrought considerable destruction within a few months.
The authorities of the Federation and the Republics
have shown themselves to be powerless to enforce
respect for ... ceasefire agreements ...
Since the very existence of the Yugoslav state presupposed functioning federal institutions,
the Commission reasoned, the collapse of these institutions and the recourse to force
entailed nothing less than "a process of dissolution" of the Yugoslav state Into its
component republics. The Yugoslav state was thereby said to be losing its international
legal personality, with the six republics collectively succeeding to that personality.
In the second and third Opinions, issued on 11 January 1992, the Commission made further
determinations that flowed directly from the first judgment. According to the Commission,
with the disappearance of central authority, the republics' territorial relations interse were
to be governed-even before the territories' objective emergence as states, let alone any
formal external recognition-by the venerable principle of uti possidetis, which in the
decolonization context had ascribed to the newly independent states their previous
colonial boundaries
From a traditional standpoint, these judgments are littered with errors: First, the
Commission treats federal states as though different from unitary states, whereas a federal
Al

Badinter Commission OpInions, supra note 19, at 1495, No. 1, par. 1(d).

3 Id. at 1496-97, No. 1, para. 2.
Id. at 1493, 1500, No. 1, para. 3.

Id. at 1498, 1500, Nos. 2 & 3. Although the Commission did not predicate its framework of decslon
on
constitutional Interpretation,

it

asserted that the principle by which the boundaries were internationalized

applied "all the more readily to the Republics since the second and fourth paragraphs of Article 5 of the
Consttution of the SFRY stpulated that the Republics' territories and boundaries could not be altered without
their consent." Id. at 1500, No. 3. This statement rather conveniently omitted mention of the provision ofArticle
5 that required consent of all Republics to the changes in SFRY frontiers.
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or unitary institutional configuration-an artifact of a constitutional order that the state
my alter or overthrow in the exercise of "inalienable" sovereign prerogative-is
traditionally deemed irrelevant to a state's international legal personality.4 1
Second, as noted above, the Commission departs from a consistent pattern of state
practice and opiniojuris in identifying a loss of governmental coherence with a loss of state
coherence. Many states have undergone far more prolonged periods in which the central
government lacked effective control over large portions of the national territory, yet in
none of these cases did the international order regard the state as having been in a
process of dissolution.
Third, whereas the Commission deems an inability to maintain effective control and to
quell violence in the national territory as indicative of dissolution of the SFRY, it applies no
such efficacy standard to the governments of the emergent successor states (in particular,
Croatia and, subsequently, Bosnia-Herzegovina, both of which would manifestly have failed
such a test). This turns on its head the traditional rule against "premature recognition"
that resists acknowledging new sovereignty arrangements until they have been irreversibly
established on the ground.
Fourth, the Commission imports the principle of uti possidetis from the decolonization
process, unmindful of the implications of newly decolonized entities having been liberated
from the colonial powers rather than from one another. In the colonial context, uti
possidetis preserved the status quo inter se, whereas here it produced a drastic shift in
power relations among the emergent states' constituent groups. Indeed, at least from
the perspective of the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia, the SFRY internal boundaries
had been thoroughly predicated on the unity of-and balance of federal rights amongthe ethnic communities that the Yugoslav state embodied.4 " Moreover, whereas uti
possidetis had previously taken effect upon the establishment of new states emerging from

41 See Montevideo Convention, supra note 18, art. 2 ("The federal state shall constitute a sole person in the
eyes
ofinternational law.").
42

See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in

Statehood, 35 WORLD POLS. 1 (1982).
41 See generally ANA S. TRBOVICH, A LEGAL GEOGRAPHY or YUGOSLAVIA'S DISINTEGRATION (2008),
44 See, e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 138 (C.H.M. Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) ("[S]o long as a real struggle is

proceeding, recognition is premature, whilst, on the other hand, mere persistence of the old state in a struggle
that has obviously become hopeless Is not a sufficient cause for withholding It."), quoted in David A. ljalaye, Was
"Biafro" At Any Time a State in International Law?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 551, 558 (1971).
45 See, e.g., Pomerance, supra note 36, at 50-57.
4h See Radan, Yugoslavia's Internal Borders as International Borders,
supro note 30.
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colonialism, here the boundaries were deemed to become inviolable at the inception of a
"process of dissolution"4
By invoking the combination of non-consensual dissolution and uti possidetis, the
Commission managed to validate the dismemberment of the SFRY into its component
republics without any resort to the principle of self-determination, thereby avoiding sticky
questions about the right to self-determination on the part of Serbs within Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whatever might be said for the latter-to which the Commission
spoke in the vaguest possible terms-this right could not be implemented through forcible
changes in the Republics' boundaries.45 Croatia's Serbs might well have wondered why, if
Croatia could be supported in its secession from Yugoslavia, a Croatian Serb republic
(Republika Srpska Krajina) could not be equally supported in its effort to secede from
Croatia. The answer given-a masterpiece of bloodless formalism-was that Croatia was
not seceding, but rather succeeding to a share, demarcated by the republic borders, of the
legal personality of the dissolved Yugoslav federation.50
In reality, the Commission's judgments were responsive to situational considerations of
morality, policy, and politics that were orthogonal to the doctrinal considerations on which
the Commission purported to rely. As the Croatian conflict had by late 1991 already
demonstrated, an internal war to carve out new territorial units on an ethno-national basis
would entail, as an almost inevitable concomitant, the phenomenon of mass expulsions
and associated atrocities that has come to be known by the failed euphemism, "ethnic
cleansing."5 If an ethno-national project could establish an internationally recognized
claim to territory by seizing and holding effective control over it, there would be a natural
motivation to purge the territory of populations presumptively loyal to a rival project (and
indeed, even to encourage rivals' expulsions of one's own co-ethnics, who could then be
settled in the carved-out territory, completing its demographic transformation). As applied
to the case at hand, the Commission's approach seemed well calculated to stem a kind of
violence, however "internal," that the international order came to perceive as beyond the
pale.5 2

47 See JOVANOVIC, supra note 36, at 107.
4BadInter Commission OpInions, supra note 19, at 1497-1500, Nos. 2 & 3.
49 For a summary of the Serb grievances against the emergent Croatian state, see Robert M. Hayden, Nationalism
in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics, 51 SLAVIC REv. 654, 657-58 (1992).

BadInter Commission OpInions, supra note 19, at 1495-96, No. 1, para.1 (e).
1See Prosecutor v. Martie, supra note 31, paras. 161-336.
Whereas the international system had once accepted "population transfer" as a legitimate means of
sorting out
rival self-determination claims, see, for example, Tmothy Wiliam Waters, Remembering Sudetenland: On the
Legal Construction of Ethnic Cleansing, 47 VA. J. OF INT'L LAw 63 (2006). That system was now coming to
32

understand both the end and the probable means of such transfer as "crimes against humanity." See, e.g., UN
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Yet in broad structural terms, the Badinter Commission judgments represented simply a
reallocation of licenses to establish and maintain order by force. Underscoring this point is
Croatia's 1995 Operation Storm, which forcibly asserted Croatia's sovereignty over the
Republic's breakaway territories, and which is widely characterized as having entailed
"ethnic cleansing" in the reverse direction.
As to both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Commission invoked referendum results as
a guide to popular will in those republics in a manner that begged the question: The
democratic will of majorities within pre-established territories was credited, whereas the
democratic will of the (more or less geographically-concentrated) Serb populations of
those territories-either to remain within one Yugoslavia or, alternatively, to secede prior
to the pre-established territories' emergence as sovereign states-was expressly
disregarded. Whereas artifacts of Yugoslav constitutionalism were invoked where
favorable to separation, the consociational aspects of the federation's constitutional
traditions-according political status to constituent ethnic communities as well as to
S4
territorially-defined populations-were conveniently forgotten. The Badinter Commission
solution's overall emphasis on the republics' boundaries at the expense of ethno-national
claims for self-determination served, not to thwart ethno-nationalism throughout the

Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, Rome Statute of the Internationa Criminal Court, Art. 7 (1998) (enumerating crimes against
humanity: A "widespread or systematic attack . . against [a] civilian population"); Prosecutor v. Blagojevi and
Joki4, Case No. IT-02-60-T, 1 595 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005) ("[D]isplacements

within a state or across national borders, for reasons not permitted under International law, are crimes
punishable under customary international law.").

" See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Crootia: impunity for Abuses Committed Owing 'Operation Storm' and the
Denial
of the
Right
of Refugees
to
Return
to
the
Krajinca,
8
REPORTS
13
(1996),
http://www.nrw.arg/reports/1996/Croatia.htm ("The offensive .. . resulted in the ... displacement of an
estimated 200,000 who fled in the immediate aftermath.... These abuses by Croatian government forces, which
continued on a large scale even months after the area had been secured by Croatian authorities, included

summary executions of elderly and infirm Serbs who remained behind and the wholesale burning and destruction
of Serbian villages and property.').

4 On October 14, 1991 Bosna's Parliament declared the Republic's sovereignty, with the support of parties
associated with the Bosniak plurality (an estimated 44% of Bosnia's population) and the Croat minority (17%),
albeit without the participation of the parties associated with the Serb minority (31%). In its January 11, 1992
Opinion (No. 4), the Commission concluded that "the will of the peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina to constitute the
[Republic] as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established..." Badinter

Commission Opinions, supra note 19, at 1503, No. 4. But then, curiously, it added: "This assessment could be
reviewed if appropriate guarantees were provided by the Republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of

a referendum of all the citizens of the [Republic] without distinction, carried out under international supervision."
Id. The non sequitur was entirely overlooked: the first sentence invoked "the will of the peoples" severally,
whereas the second evidently eschewed peoplehood as a relevant category, indicating that the will of a simple
majority of individual citizens can override a dissenting "people," however cohesive.
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SFRY, but to realize exclusively those ethno-national aspirations that happily coincided
with constitutionally-established boundaries.
Jure Vidmar (among others) contends provocatively that it was not the constitutional basis,
but the historical "pedigree" of the particular internal boundaries, that was the decisive
consideration in the Commission's assessment of the Yugoslav dissolution." The problem
with that explanation-which the Commission nowhere invoked-is the ineluctable
contentiousness of this and any such proposition, in the Yugoslav case and beyond. The
history can be read in different ways, emphasizing different historical baselines. It is
ahistorical to imply that six independent states, possessed of these borders, consensually
united to form the Yugoslav federation.S7 Moreover, while there is historical "pedigree" to
boundaries that left Croatian and Bosnian Serbs separate from Serbia and subject to nonSerb territorial majorities, this was one of the problems to which the Yugoslav federation
was supposed to have been a solution; the federation was conceptualized as a union of
constituent nations, and Serb assent to the legitimacy of the internal boundaries
58
presupposed, and was contingent on, the continued existence of the union.
Nonetheless, there was a distinct sense in which the Badinter Commission had ample basis
for adjudging that "the essential organs of the federation ... no longer meet the criteria of
participation and representativeness inherent in a federal state." There was not simply a

See, e.g., Peter Radan, The Badiater Arbitration Commission and the Partition of Yugoslavia, 25 NATIONALITIES
PAPERS: J. NATIONALISM & ETHNICITY 537, 543 (1997).

VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 234.
*According to notions predominant in Slovenia and Croatia, the federation represented a historically contingent
agreement of its several constituent territorial republics, the boundaries of which conceptually preceded rather
derived from the union; In this view, each republic maintained, as an Inherent right of self determination, a latent
sovereign capacity to exit the arrangement with its borders Intact. Support for that position might be drawn from
leading SFRY jurist Edvard Kardelj's Socialist-era understanding of self-determination in the Yugoslav context. For
Kardelj, "the legitimacy of Yugoslavia [was] only derivative and tentative"-a mere epiphenomenon of the
socialist project that subsequently disappeared. Zoran Oklopcic, Beyond Empty, Conservative, and Ethereal:
Pluralist Self Determination and a Peripheral Political imaginary, 26 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 509, 518-19 (2013). Yet
Kardelj's conception-however popular with his fellow Slovenes-did not have the field to itself. More
importantly, there was still less accord on the alternative. As Oklopcic indicates, "While all Yugoslav constitutions
affirmed the various nations' right to self-determination, including the right of secession, a fundamental
ambiguity remained as to whom exactly this right belonged-to South-Slavic Yugoslav ethnoi, or the demoi of
Yugoslavia's component republics." Id. at 520. The distinction, while appearing to set an ethnic against a civic
brand of nationalism, in reality merely determines which ethno-national aspirations will be satisfied or frustrated
once secessionism seizes the agenda.
Serb nationalists would likely express the point in a one-word rejoinder: "Jasenovac," the concentration camp
in the World War II-era Independent State of Croatia (NDH)-an entity that encompassed roughly the combined
territories of present-day Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina-in which an extraordinary number of Serbs perished
(along with Jews, Roma, and others). See JASENOVAC MEMORIAL SITE, List of individual Victims of Josenovac

Concentration Camp, http://www.jusp-jasenovac.hr/Default.aspx?sid=6711.
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crisis of federal institutions (which ordinarily would call for non-interference); there had
been, in effect, an undemocratic coup d'gtat, and further, a coup d'gtot that constituted a
hijacking of multinational Yugoslavia by a plurality (but not majority) ethno-national
movement. MilogeviCs Yugoslavia could not be perceived to represent the selfdetermination of 'the whole people . . . without distinction." Moreover, the Serb
minority's "recourse to force" in Croatia (and later, in Bosnia-Herzegovina), which might
conceivably have been regarded as a defensive effort to forestall majority domination, was
not so regarded, because of the actual character of the violence on the ground. Whatever
the ideological neutrality of the post-decolonization UN peace and security order, the UN
system's neutrality had never extended to the Axis-era fascism of which the Serb
nationalist movement appeared reminiscent, in both rhetoric and behavior.S
The Badinter Commission's real assessment, albeit operating beneath the surface, was
undoubtedly a substantive assessment of the relative justness of the contending
communities' recourse to force. The Commission took sides in the conflict, not by neutral
application of procedural norms, but in an effort to thwart the Serb nationalist cause.
Although reflecting normative considerations embedded in the foundations of the
international order-as evidenced by the international community's swift action to follow
the Commission's lead in according recognition to the emergent statesCo-the judgments
were ad hoc, neither reflective of existing legal doctrines nor generative of new ones likely
to be applied going forward.
11. Kosovo Independence: Deciding Not to Decide the Remedial Secession Question

'

On 17 February 2008, after almost nine years of limbo as a de facto UN protectorate,
Serbia's erstwhile autonomous province of Kosovo-as represented by the full
membership of the Assembly set up as part of the UN-orchestrated "Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo" (PISG)-unilaterally declared independence.6
Although substantial parts of the international community continue to withhold official
recognition-including, notably, European Union members Cyprus, Greece, Romania,
Slovakia, and Spain, as well as such leading non-European states as Brazil, China, India,
Mexico, Russia, and South Africa-108 UN member states have officially recognized
Kosovo. This qualified success is very rare in cases where a territory seeking separation

9 See, e.g., ROBERT 0. PAXTON, THE ANATOMY OF FASCISM 189-90 (2004) ("[P]inning the epithet of fascist on
Miosevic ... seems appropriate').

60 Ironcally, while the Commssion's early judgments sought to establish the legal status of the entitles
in
question, the Commission advised the withholding of diplomatic recognition to Croatia, pending reform of its

legal standards regarding the treatment of mnorities. Contrast Badinter Commission Opinions, supra note 19, at
1503, 1505, No. 5, with id. at 1507, 1517, No. 7. However, the crucial question of legal status having been taken

as resolved, ths further advice was ignored.
6' Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 74-76.
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does not (by whatever means) obtain the consent of the non-dissolved state to which it
has theretofore been integral 6 2
The Kosovo case naturally raises the issue of "remedial secession": whether a state may
forfeit its sovereignty over an integral territorial unit within which it has engaged in a
pattern of prolonged and serious human rights abuses. The Milosevic government's 1989
withdrawal of Kosovo's autonomy and the ensuing pattern of harsh discrimination against
the province's large majority (over eighty-five percent) of ethnic Albanians precipitated a
serious crisis by the late 1990s, as an ethnic-Albanian insurgency was met by ever more
ruthless counterinsurgent efforts. 3 After the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) (FRY) rebuffed Security Council demands that it desist from its normoffending actions in that territory" and refused to accede to the comprehensive solution
proposed by Western powers in the Rambouillet "accords,"
the Security Council
deadlocked on the question of forcible imposition, setting the stage for the famously
unauthorized seventy-nine-day NATO air campaign. ""Although the Security CounclI never
affirmed the lawfulness of the NATO intervention, it adopted that intervention's fruits in
Resolution 1244, precluding the FRY's exercise of territorial control and placing Kosovo
under, in effect, an international trusteeship 6 7
Resolution 1244, "Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," purported to operate
without prejudice to Kosovo's formal status as an integral part of the FRY (succeeded by
Serbia following the 2006 negotiated independence of Montenegro) pending a negotiated
settlement. Yet the negotiation process dragged on in manifest futility, with Serbia
6 Non-Self-Governing Territories are, by definition, non-integral to the sovereign
states that govern them. See,
e.g., G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supro note 4.
'3

See generally INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL

RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED (2000) ("Goldstone Commission Report").
See S.C. Res. 1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203 (Oct. 24, 1998) (invoking
Chapter VII powers in addressing the Kosovo situation).

Interim

Agreement

for

Peace

and

Self-Government

in

Kosovo

http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/990123_Rambou~lletAccord.pdf

(Feb.

23,

1999),

[hereinafter

Rambouillet Accords].
See Press Release, Security Council, U.N. Press Release SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999) (reflecting that Russia,
China,
and Namibia support draft Security Council resolution, defeated 3-12-0, characterizing NATO's "unilateral use of

force" as "a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter" and demanding "an immediate cessation").
67 S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999) (demonstrating a vote of 14-0-1, with China abstaining).
6 See id. The Resolution speaks of "the people of Kosovo" enjoying "substantial autonomy within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. Id. at para. 10. It also speaks of "[p]romoting the establishment, pending a final
settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the

Rambouillet accords." Id. at para. 11(a). The annex, in turn, discusses a "political process towards the
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unwilling to yield formal sovereignty and the Kosovars unwilling to accept anythIng less
than full independence. Meanwhile, the indefinite perpetuation of provisional
arrangements was widely perceived to impede the territory's economic and social
development.6 1
Thus arose the Kosovars' Unilateral Declaration of independence (UDI) and Serbia's
ensuing request to the UN General Assembly-approved by a vote of seventy-seven to six,
with seventy-four abstentions-for an ICJ Advisory Opinion on the following question: "Is
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment of Kosovo in accordance with international law?" 70 Remarkably, the
resolution did not speak of the "legal consequences" of the UDI, 1 thereby omitting
expressly to oblige the Court to address the legal status of Kosovo and the legality of
recognitions that foreign states had already conferred (forty-eight of them by the date of
the resolution, and sixty-nine by the date of the issuance of the Advisory Opinion).7
Serbia's formulation appears to have been a studied effort to avoid a diplomatic affront to
states that had already recognized Kosovo, while at the same time indirectly to induce the
Court to speak to the declaration's overall implications. That effort appears, in retrospect,
to have been too clever.
By the operation of traditional doctrine, there is a blanket answer to the question of
whether any UDI is "in accordance with international law." Apart from cases in which the
declarations are intertwined with extrinsic violations of international legal norms (such as

establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo,
taking full account of the Ramboullet accords and the prncples of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." U.N. Doc. 5/1999/648, Annex 2, para. 8 (June 7, 1999). The Rarnbouillet
document itself provides that "national communities" therein recognized "shall not use their additional rights to
endanger .. .the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Rambouillet Accords,
supra note 65, at Framework, Art. 1(2).
In 2007, the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Envoy, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, authored a
Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement, expressing the unsatisfactoriness of preserving the status
quo indefinitely. Comprehensive
Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement (Mar.
26, 2007),
http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensve_proposal-english.pdf;
see generally Tean d'Aspremont,
Regulating Statehood: The Kosovo Status Settlement, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'LL 649 (2007).
"o G.A. Res. 63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008).
71

Cf., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion,

2004 1.CJ. Rep. 36 (July 9).
The resolution was passed on 8 October 2008. The dates of recognitions of Kosovo can be found, inter alia, on
the webpage of the Kosovo's MINIsTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33 (last visited June 18,
2015).
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resistance to decolonization or a foreign state's inadmissible use of force), a UIDI per se is
not subject to international legal regulation7
The international legal order traditionally seeks neither to reinforce nor to undermine state
control over internally disputed territory (notwithstanding its concern with human rights
issues relating to these disputes and with humanitarian law issues relating to the internal
armed conflicts that the disputes occasion). It regulates external involvement in secession
disputes, but it presumptively neither forbids nor validates internal efforts at secession.7 4
Historically, secessionists have assumed the risk of forcible suppression (subject to the
constraints of human rights and humanitarian law) and, where successful by their own
efforts (without inadmissible foreign assistance) have reaped the reward of international
recognition. 7S The non-regulation of such efforts has not been a mere omission or gap in
the law; the consignment of such matters to the domestic jurisdiction has constituted an
affirmative norm of the international order. International law ascribes legal consequences
to the internal developments as they play out, but the internal decisions to reaffirm or to
repudiate the political status quo have traditionally been understood to fall within a
domaine reserve.
Thus, the phrasing of the question gave the Court an opportunity to give an answer-that
the UDI did not violate international law-that left open the central legal controversies.
Given the absence of a coherent collective opinio juris-as reflected in the clashing
memorials that governments from around the world submitted-the Court would have

As the Court noted, the "Illegality attached to the declarations of independence [of Southern Rhodesia,
Northern Cyprus, and Republika Srpska] stemmed not from the unilateral character ofthese declarations as such,
but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other

egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus
cogens)." Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supro note 8, para. 81.
7

In the Court's words, "[Tlhe scope of the prIncIple of terrtoril integrity Is confined to the sphere of relations

between States." Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 80.
7

See, e.g., Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R.

217, 290, para.

144 (Can.),

http://scc-

csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/1ndex.do ("It may be that a unilateral secession by Quebec would
eventually be accorded legal status by Canada and other states, and thus give rise to legal consequences; but this

does not support the more radical contention that subsequent recognition of a state of affairs brought about by a
unilateral declaration of independence could be taken to mean that secession was achieved under colour of a
legal right.").

/ Judge Simma's separate opinion ascribes the Court's presumptive neutrality to "an old, tired view
of
international law, which takes the adage, famously expressed in the 'Lotus' Judgment, according to which

restrictions on the independence of States cannot be presumed because of the consensual nature of the
international legal order." Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supro note 8, para. 2 (separate opinion by Simma, J.J. Apart

from failing to note that the supposed "Lotus principle" by Its nature has no application to sub-state units,
Simma's ascription misconstrues the doctrinal point: The non-judgmentalism stems not from absence of law, but
from an affirmative norm regarding (for better or worse) the outcome of such struggles as "matters essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction." See Friendly Relations Declaration, supro note 5.
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had little basis for an authoritative answer? The question's wording spared the Court the
embarrassment of having to declare as non liquet issues of which it was unequivocally
seised.
Unfortunately, however, in order to perform this dodge, the Court had to make a rather
dubious move, asserting-in what amounts to a disguised tautology-that the declarant
body, though established as part of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of
Kosovo under Security Council Resolution 1244, was acting in a different-and yet
somehow, not wrongfully ultra vires-capacity.
The Court characterizes the declarants as
acting "together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the
framework of the interim administration."7 3 But since the Security Council's intervention to
bar Serbia's exercise of police power in the territory was the sine quo non of all of the
Kosovo Assembly's activities (within or without "the framework of the interim
administration") and since the intervention's mandate forbade prejudice to Serbia's
territorial integrity, the Security Council thereby undertook a commitment to avoid
allowing the Kosovars to exploit the intervention for secessionist purposes-a commitment
that can be presumed to have been indispensable to Russian support for, and Chinese
acquiescence in, the authorization of the Mission as a whole.
Having occurred under UN protection, the Kosovars' proclamation of independence fell
beyond the bounds of the norm that would have entitled it to be regarded with neutrality.
Thus, the Court could not justly spare itself the burden of determining whether the
Kosovars had an international legal entitlement, under a doctrine of remedial secession,
to effect independence.

See Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 82 (showing that states have expressed "radically different

views" on the doctrinal Issues central to determining Kosovo's status: (1) "Whether, outside the context of nonself-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation, the International

law of self determination of peoples confers upon part of the population of an existing State a right to separate
from that state"; (2) "whether international law provides for a right of 'remedial secession' and, if so, in what
circumstances"; and (3) "whether the circumstances which some participants maintained would give rise to a
right of'remedial secession' were actually present in Kosovo").
7 See Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supro note 8, paras. 102-09.

74Id. at par. 109. To infer any legal conclusions about Kosovar "peoplehood" on this basis would be to overread
what Zoran Oklopcic properly calls "a seemingly off-the-cuff remark." Zoran Oklopcic, Preliminary Thoughts on the
Kosovo Opinion, EiL: TALK! (July 26, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/preliminary-thoughts-on-the-kosovo-

opinion/#more-2505. The use of that the term "people" may refer merely to the declarants' subjective
understanding of their "capacity." Id.

a For arguments in favor, see the Statement of Federal Republic of Germany filed with the international Court
of
Justice in connection with the Kosovo Advisory Proceedings, at 34-37, available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/141/15624.pdf. See also Written Statements of Albania, Estonia, Poland, and Ireland,
ovoilable at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=1.
But see,
e.g., Written Statements of Cyprus, Spain, and the Russian Federation. For a study of these submissions, see

Marko Milanovic, Arguing the Kosovo Case, in THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE Kosovo ADVisoRY OPINION (Marko
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Nonetheless, the ICJ can scarcely be blamed for the sleight of hand, any more than the
Badinter Commission can be blamed for its pretense that its findings on Croatian and
Bosnian statehood followed from the application of established legal norms. In both
instances, hyper-formalism furnished an opportunity to defer authoritative consideration
of questions that are, in the collective opinio juris of states, fundamentally unsettled. In
both instances, the apparently predominant moral reaction of the international
community to the particular cases was allowed to prevail without any acknowledged
alteration to existing doctrine. And in both instances, perhaps not coincidentally, the losers
were Serbs, whose legal interests-whether or not otherwise worthy-effectively incurred
a penalty for transgressions committed in the name of the Serb nation that, even if
doctrinally immaterial, had poisoned the well.
D. Self-Determination of Peoples in a Pluralist Global Order
As noted at the outset above, self-determination plays a paradoxical role in the
international legal order. That concept establishes the very foundation of the system's
operative norms: The UN Charter is notionally established by the "Peoples" of the member
states through their "respective Governments," and its premier "Principle"-the
"sovereign equality" of states (Article 2(1)), from which is deduced the system's default
peace and security norms-is grounded in the "purpose" of developing "friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples" (Article 1(2)). Precisely because this is transparent hypocrisy-precisely because
the effective authority of governmental apparatuses is being rationalized as a
manifestation of the will of respective peoples in the absence of the slightest indication of
accountability-self-determination's role in the content of operative norms is necessarily
indirect. As La Rochefoucauld teaches, "Hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue) 8
A system nominally predicated on the principle of self-determination is constrained to
produce operative norms that can be rationalized as manifesting that consideration, even
while that system functions in practice as a working arrangement among participants who
owe their standing more to their control over than to approval by the "peoples" that they
presume to represent.

MIanoic & Michael Wood eds., 2014), nttp://ssrn.ciom/abstract=2412219. As Milanovic reports: "Perhaps the

most remarkable Item from the fIrst round is that one state In the pro-Serbia camp did explicitly endorse the rIght
to remedial secessIon-RussIa-while claimIng that Kosovo did not satisfy its requirements on the facts. It was

indeed the only member of the P-5 to do so." Id. at 25.
NJEREMY

LOTT, IN DEFENE OF HYPOCRISY 60 (2006).
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1. Self-Determination in Colonial Territories and Integral Territories
In 1960, the UN General Assembly authoritatively reinterpreted the self-determination
principle as applied to the "Non-Self-Governing Territories" previously accommodated by
Article 73, thereby expiating the UN system's "original sin" of acquiescence in
colonialism." The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples affirmed that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development."" There was no ambiguity about what it meant for peoples to
"freely determine their political status" in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories:
"immediate steps" were to be taken "to transfer all powers to the peoples of those
territories." 8 4 An accompanying resolution, aimed at the stubborn Portuguese insistence
on the integral nature of overseas territories that were "known to be of the colonial type,"
defined as Non-Self-Governing any "territory which is geographically separate and is
distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it" and which is subject
to "administrative, political, juridical, economic, or historical" factors that "arbitrarily place
it in a position or status of subordination."85 Territorial populations could decline the
independence option in favor of "Free association with an independent State" or
"Integration with an independent State," but only after clearing procedural hurdles
designed to verify the authenticity of the decision to forsake independencei
The Charter and the decolonization resolutions left unclear whether a "people" was
implicitly defined as the whole territorial population of any given state or Trust or NonSelf-Governing Territory. There was perfect clarity, however, about the inadmissibility of
any invocation of the self-determination principle in aid of external efforts to fragment
either existing sovereign states or entities entitled to an option of sovereignty: "Any
attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the

2See

generally W. OFUATEY-KODJOE,

THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1977).

G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 4, at para. 2. The Security Council reaffirmed the statement in S.C. Res. 183,

paragraph 4 (Dec. 11, 1963), and the language Is repeated verbatm in Common Article 1 of the 1966 Human
Rights Covenants. ICCPR, supro note 2, art. 1. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan.

3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1.
s4 G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 4, at para.
5.
G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 4, Annex, Principles 1, IV, V.
See id, at Principles II, VI VII, Vill, IX.

Id. (containing at some points plural references (e.g., "the territory and Its peoples") thereby Implying that a
single Non-Self-Governing Territory can contain more than one people, though this plurality is given no operative
significance).
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United Nations."8 5 This point is reiterated in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration,
though in a curious way:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed
as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples as described above and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging
to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
color. 5
On the one hand, this "safeguard clause" must be understood in the decolonization
context; it was written to encompass Rhodesia and South Africa, where the "subjection of
peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation" was intra-territorial. The
qualifying language evinced no intent to extend the right of populations to sovereign
independence beyond the role of corrective to colonialism and its vestiges; the widest
variety of authoritarian and ethnically unbalanced regimes, "representing" their
populations within the terms established by their prevailing ideologies, were intended to
pass this test.90
On the other hand, the safeguard clause is the UN system's most revealing authoritative
statement of the rationale on which the territorial integrity norm hinges. (Moreover,
subsequent iterations have broadened the last clause of the qualifier to speak of "a
government representing the whole people . . . without distinction of any kind.")" The
animating rationale inevitably suggests, however abstractly, some threshold at which it
would be admissible to "dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independent States;"" being a statement of general
principle, it further suggests that vestiges of Western European "salt water colonialism"
cannot be for all time unique in meeting this threshold.

G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra rote 4, at para. 6.
9

Frendly Relations Declaration, supro note 5 (emphasis added).

" See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL
115-18 (1995) (discussing the

preparatory work to the safeguard clause, which reveals concessions to non-liberal-democratic states).
1See G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 7; United Nations World Conference on Human Rghts, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, supra note 7.
c)2Frendly Relations Declaration, supro note 5.
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Thus, however open-textured the interpretation of governmental conduct "in compliance
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples," the doctrine's
foundations cannot altogether preclude the possibility of a legal justification for external
assistance to secession. Moreover, the extent of the international order's tolerance for
heterogeneity of internal governing arrangements has not remained frozen. The dynamic
nature of what I have elsewhere termed "bounded pluralism" is reflected in the very fact
that what was once dignified as "population transfer" is now authoritatively abominated as
"ethnic cleansing"-conduct that authoritative documents have, however qualifiedly,
identified with forfeiture of sovereign prerogative. Even so, the international order, while
occasionally validating external action against a manifestly illegitimate effective
government, 9 4 has rarely validated externally-sponsored fracturing of the territorial units.
I. Presumptive "Trial by Ordeal" and the Emerging Doctrine of "Remedial Secession"
Long after-and paradoxically, as a concomitant of-the collective renunciation of crossborder uses of force, the international system continued to dignify the internal use of force
as a basis for setting the terms of territorial public order. The 1933 Montevideo
Convention 96-best
read in conjunction with a contemporaneous Latin American treaty,
the 1929 Civil Strife Convention (an early articulation of the non-intervention norm)1-and

GA. Res. 60/1, para. 139 (Sept. 16, 2005) (affirming the Security Council's authority to Intervene forcibly in the
internal affairs of sovereign states, in furtherance of the "responsibility to protect," where "national authorities
are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity").
For example, coups

in

Haiti in 1994 and 5ierra Leone in 1997 drew not only international condemnation, but

also contrued recognition of the ousted government-in-exile, leading ultimately to a forcible restoration. In these
cases, there had been a landslide victory of the ousted President in a very recent, internationally-monitored

election, as well as notorious brutality and demonstrable unpopularity on the part of the forces Involved in the
coup. As a result, a vast diversity of international actors, cutting across the international system's plurality of
interests and values, were able to perceive in common a population's manifest will to restore an ousted
government. See BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 366-87, 405-09 (1999).
95

The establishment of Bangladesh as a result of India's 1971 intervention in East Pakistan is a rare instance
of

such fracturing. Even there, the initial U.N. General Assembly Indirectly repudiated the external use of force that
enabled Bangladesh's independence. G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI) (Dec. 7, 1971) (calling "upon the Governments of India
and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on
the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders").
See Montevideo Convention, supra note 19.

Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, May 21, 1929, 134 LN.T.S. 45, art. 1
(codifying an Inter-American treaty forbidding "the traffic in arms and war material, except when intended for the
Government, while the belligerency of the rebels has not been recognized, in which latter case the rules of
neutrality shall be applied").
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"the rule against premature recognition"9 8 were invoked to validate the outcome of any
contest untainted by inadmissible foreign assistance to separatist forces. States were
licensed to crush internal efforts at territorial fragmentation; only when they proved
confessedly unwilling or decisively unable to do so did they lose their legal claim to
territorial integrity.
In effect, independence forces demonstrated their legitimacy by winning a civil war against
the odds, odds made longer by the asymmetry of non-intervention norms, which imposed
an absolute ban only on assistance to the separatists. While not precluding secessionists
from taking their best shot, 9 the doctrinal formula presumptively forbade external
assistance to local forces challengingI-but not to local forces bolstering 0 5 -the existing
territorial boundaries fixed at the inception of the current peace and security order.
Such a "trial by ordeal" doctrine is not as completely bereft of moral logic as it may initially
appear. External assistance to separatist forces has been a notorious means of both great
power predation and regional mischief. Moreover, however arbitrary state boundaries
may be, settled bases for reconfiguration tend to be elusive. Territories-whether of whole
states or of the entities for which secession is sought-frequently lack demographic
coherence (though such coherence can, as we have lately seen, be ruthlessly imposed).
Given the conundrum of delimiting political communities with inter-mixed populations and
overlapping historical claims, an alternative doctrine would be difficult to design.

"' See, e.g., MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 383 (5th ed. 2003); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 45-46 (1947) ("[T]he sovereignty of the mother country is a legally relevant factor so long as it not

abundantly clear that the lawful government has lost all hope or abandoned all effort to reassert Its dominion.")
"Successful revolution sooner or later begets its own legality." STANLEY A. OE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL ANC
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 66-67 (3d ed. 1977).
9

1981 Non-Intervention Declaration, supro note 6, Annex, art. 2(f) (affirming "[t]he duty of a state to refrain
from the promotion, encouragement, or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities within
liW

other States, under any pretext whotsoever, or any action whIch seems to dIsrupt the unIty or to undermine or
subvert the political order of other States" (emphasis added)).

101

A complicated question arises when insurgent forces acheve such efficacy as to achieve the status of

"belligerent," thereby establishing the existence of a full-fledged "civil war." Since a government's standing
traditionally hinges on its maintenance of effective control through internal processes, the inability of a regime to

maintaIn control by its own devices calls that standng into question, thereby arguably trIggering an obligation of
foreign states to observe neutrality. See, e.g., Institut de Drot International, Resolution: The Principle of Non-

Intervention in Civil Wors (Aug. 14, 1975), http://www.idl-lil.org/idlE/resolutionsE/1975_wies_03_en.pdf; see
generally Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Volidity of Military Intervention by invitotion of the Government, 56

BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 189 (1986). For a recent assessment of thIs issue, see Dapo Akande & Zachary Vermeer, The
Airstrikes Against lslamic State in Iraq and the Alleged Prohibition on Militory Assistance to Governments in Civil
Wars, EOL: TALK! (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.arg/the-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-in-traq-and-thealleged-prohibition-on-military-assistance-to-governrments-in-civil-wars/ (last visited June 18, 2015).
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An international validation of secessionism would risk incentivizing ethno-nationalist
mobilizations in majority-minority regions-which, inter alia, rarely augurs well for the
ethnic groups that are minorities within such regions. Such validation might even
incentivize local political entrepreneurs to commit acts calculated to provoke a ruthless
backlash, which could then be invoked to make a case for 'remedial secession."' 0 2 The
traditional rule is a harsh rule, but it is designed to avert scenarios that can be harsher still.
And yet, this "trial by ordeal" doctrine seems highly unsatisfactory in an international
system that purports to subject exercises of power to the rule of law. In an international
system in which statehood is rationalized as a manifestation of the self-determination of
"the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction," there must be some
limit-even apart from the expressly designated contexts of "colonial domination, alien
occupation, and racist (apartheid) regimes"-to the domination that the international
order can rationalize.
Any narrow exception will be grounded neither in the inherent rights of an ethnicallydelimited political community nor in the "democratic" will of a population delimited by
such internal boundaries as a domestic political order may have established at a given
time. It will be grounded, rather, in the future-oriented concern that whereas statehood in
principle represents the self-determination of the territorial population as a whole going
forward, a particular existing delimitation may doom a territorially concentrated ethnic
minority to subordination and predation within an inalterably adverse political community.
Only such extreme circumstances might justify relaxation of a rule that is needed to preempt endless controversy and bloodletting.
/1/. The Inapplicability of Self-Determination to Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
The implications for the Ukraine Crises of 2014-2015 are clear. Even if the Kosovo example
is taken to reflect the international community's tacit acceptance of a principle of remedial
secession, such a principle would validate external assistance to secessionist efforts only
where the predations suffered by the territorially concentrated ethnic minority are so
grave and prolonged as to establish clearly the futility of any alternative that preserves the
territorial integrity of the existing state. Whatever merit may be ascribed to the Crimean
(and Donetsk and Luhansk) secessionists' suspicions about the future behavior of the
newly established government in Kiev, no prima facie case has been made that the ethnic
Russian populations in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine had actually been subjected to such
severe and long-term adverse treatment as to render their condition irremediable within
the context of the Ukrainian state.

See Zaran Oklapcic, Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, Constituent Powers and the Formation of
Constitutionol Orders in the Balkans, 19 CONSTELLATIONS: INT'L]. CRITICAL & DEMOCRATIC THEORY 81, 95 (2012).
10
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Still less does any effort to ascribe "peoplehood" to the populations of the regionswhether on the basis of historical ties, ethnic linkages, pre-existing constitutional status, or
plebiscite-furnish Crimea or any other breakaway region with a lawful competence to
invite foreign support. Whereas a manifest deprivation of 'virtual" representation might
establish a deprived community as a distinct "people" with an unsatisfied right to selfdetermination, none of the recent developments in international law facilitate an
affirmative case that leads from the community's inherent characteristics to a right to
aided secession. The self-determination principle is beset by the ineluctable reality that
most genuine affective communities lack the territorial coherence that would be needed
for the self-governance of those communities and only those communities. The territorial
political community is necessarily an artificial community, to the configuration of which its
disparate members need to be reconciled based on its functions going forward. 0 3
Nothing about the Russian-speaking fifty-eight percent of Crimea's residents, or the
region's seemingly arbitrary 1954 conferral from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (a fellow unit of what was then a single
sovereign state for purposes of international law), or the special constitutional status of
Crimea within Ukraine, or even the ostensible desire of referendum voters to form an
independent polity establishes an international legal personality capable of vitiating
Ukraine's right to territorial integrity. However doctrinally confused the international
response to the "non-consensual dissolution" of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, it calculatedly produced no innovation that applies in any direct way beyond
the unique circumstances of that case.
E. Concluding Thought: The Dangers of Doctrinal Uncertainty Exceed Those of
Modification
The United Nations Charter-based international order has sought to reconcile the selfdetermination of peoples with the inviolability of state boundaries by presuming sovereign
states to be manifestations of the self-determination of the entirety of their territorial
populations. This presumption, albeit notionally rebuttable, has traditionally prevailed
even where states could only by a feat of ideological imagination be characterized as
"possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction." But the international reaction to fragmentation in the former
Yugoslavia-regarding both the initial "dissolution" and the subsequent struggle over
Kosovo-has called into question the rigid doctrines of the past, and opened the door to
it is telling that the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in Reference re Secession of Quebec, supro note
75,
perhaps the most elaborate contemporary judicial opinion anywhere on the topic, pointedly sidestepped the
question of what counts as a "people," jumping ahead conceptually to the non-violation of self-determination.
The Court thus avoided havng to determine whether the relevant "people" was comprised of (a) the entire
Quebec population, (b) the entire Quebec population minus the indigenous communities; (c) Francaphone
Quebecois, or (d) all Francophone Canadians, let alone (e) all Canadians. Id. at 282, para. 125.
1rr.i
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secessionist claims theretofore dismissible as beyond the pale. Although no vindication of
Russian intervention in Ukraine can properly be drawn from the Yugoslav cases, the
Ukrainian crises help to surface the hidden dangers of an emerging jurisprudence that
would allow heretofore inadmissible considerations-whether ethnic, historical,
constitutional, or "democratic"-to compromise the territorial inviolability norm.
Thus far, the international system has allowed only for implicit and unacknowledged
relaxations of its traditional resistance to external support for secession. Authoritative
legal actors, fearing the consequences of overt doctrinal change, have validated irregular
outcomes through well-intentioned exercises in intellectual dishonesty. But these exercises
work a long-term harm in undermining the principled foundations of legal constraint on
cross-border exertions of coercion and force. Rather than thwarting destabilizing
influences, the failure to articulate modifications to once-rigid standards merely invites the
invocation of partisan rationales based on principles-such as ethno-national coherence or
domestic constitutionality-that are alien to the structure of the international order. Such
principles, while often attractive in the context of domestic political orders, are incapable
of grounding a normative framework of peace and security in world beset by conflicting
interests and values-not to mention the former disguised as the latter.
It is not, however, necessarily fruitless to articulate doctrinal modifications that appeal to
the international community's least-common-denominator moral sensibilities. The UN
Charter-based order, for all of its counterintuitive rigidities, is predicated not on an amoral
deal among effective ruling apparatuses, but on a moral vision that brackets ideological
difference while insisting on an expandable (and demonstrably expanding) range of crosscutting imperative precepts. Whatever else it may contestably mean for a state to be
"possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction," no one can be heard to claim its compatibility with "ethnic cleansing."
If the Yugoslav cases are not given an express narrow reading, the alternative is that they
will be exploited to destabilize the international order as a whole. Apologists for Russia's
intervention in Ukraine are showing the way.

